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Abstract. Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) is a general approach to mo-
bile code safety in which programs are augmented with a certifícate (or 
proof). The practical uptake of PCC greatly depends on the existence 
of a variety of enabling technologies which allow both to prove programs 
correct and to replace a costly verification process by an efñcient checking 
procedure on the consumer side. In this work we propose Abstraction-
Carrying Code (ACC), a novel approach which uses abstract interpre-
tation as enabling technology. We argüe that the large body of applica-
tions of abstract interpretation to program verification is amenable to 
the overall PCC scheme. In particular, we rely on an expressive class 
of safety policies which can be defined over different abstract domains. 
We use an abstraction (or abstract model) of the program computed by 
standard static analyzers as a certifícate. The validity of the abstrac-
tion on the consumer side is checked in a single-pass by a very efficient 
and specialized abstract-interpreter. We believe that ACC brings the 
expressiveness, flexibility and automation which is inherent in abstract 
interpretation techniques to the área of mobile code safety. We have im-
plemented and benchmarked ACC within the Ciao system preprocessor. 
The experimental results show that the checking phase is indeed faster 
than the proof generation phase, and that the sizes of certificates are 
reasonable. 
1 Introduction 
One of the most important challenges which computing research faces today 
is the development of security techniques for verifying tha t the execution of a 
program (possibly) supplied by an untrusted source is safe, i.e., it meets certain 
properties according to a predeñned safety policy. Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) 
[15] is an enabling technology for mobile code safety which proposes to asso-
ciate safety information in the form of a certifícate to programs. The certifícate 
(or proof) is created at compile t ime, and packaged along with the untrusted 
code. The consumer who receives or downloads the code+certiñcate package can 
then run a checker which by a straightforward inspection of the code and the 
certifícate, can verify the validity of the certifícate and thus compliance with 
the safety policy. The key beneñt of this "certiñcate-based" approach to mobile 
code safety is tha t the consumer's task is reduced from the level of proving to 
the level of checking. Indeed the (proof) checker performs a task tha t should be 
much simpler, efficient, and automatic than generating the original certifícate. 
The practical uptake of PCC greatly depends on the existence of a variety 
of enabling technologies which allow: 
1. deñning expressive safety policies covering a wide range of properties, 
2. solving the problem of how to automatically genérate the certificates (i.e., 
automatically proving the programs correct), and 
3. replacing a costly veriñcation process by an efficient checking procedure on 
the consumer side. 
The main approaches applied up to now are based on theorem proving and type 
analysis. For instance, in PCC the certiñcate is originally a proof in ñrst-order 
logic of certain verification conditions and the checking process involves ensuring 
that the certiñcate is indeed a valid ñrst-order proof. In Typed Assembly Lan-
guages [13], the certiñcate is a type annotation of the assembly language program 
and the checking process involves a form of type checking. Each of the different 
approaches possess their own set of stronger and weaker points. Depending on 
the particular safety property and the available computing resources in the con-
sumer, some approaches are more suitable than others. In some cases the priority 
is to reduce the size of the certiñcate as much as possible in order to ñt in small 
devices or to cope with scarce network access (as in, e.g., Oracle-based PCC [17] 
or Tactic-based PCC [1]), whereas in other cases the priority is to reduce the 
checking time (as in, e.g., standard PCC [15] or lightweight bytecode veriñcation 
[11]). As a result of all this, a successful certiñcate infrastructure should have a 
wide set of enabling technologies available for the different requirements. 
In this work we propose Abstraction-Carrying Code (ACC), a novel approach 
which uses abstract interpretation [5] as enabling technology to handle the above 
practical (and difficult) challenges. Abstract interpretation is now a well es-
tablished technique which has allowed the development of very sophisticated 
global static program analyses that are at the same time automatic, provably 
correct, and practical. The basic idea of abstract interpretation is to infer in-
formation on programs by interpreting ("running") them using abstract valúes 
rather than concrete ones, thus obtaining safe approximations of the behavior 
of the program. The technique allows inferring much richer information than, 
for example, traditional types. This includes data structure shape (with pointer 
sharing), bounds on data structure sizes, and other operational variable instan-
tiation properties, as well as procedure-level properties such as determinacy, 
termination, non-failure, and bounds on resource consumption (time or space 
cost). Our proposal, ACC, opens the door to the applicability of the above 
domains as enabling technology for PCC. In particular, ACC has the following 
three fundamental elements: 
1. An expressive class of safety policies based on "abstract"—i.e. symbolic— 
properties over different abstract domains. Our framework is parametric 
w.r.t. the abstract domain(s) of interest, which gives us generality and ex-
pressiveness. 
2. A ñxpoint static analyzer is used to automatically infer an abstract model 
(or simply abstraction) about the mobile code which can then be used to 
prove that the code is safe w.r.t. the given policy in a straightforward way. 
We identify the particular subset of the analysis results which is sufficient 
for this purpose. 
3. A simple, easy-to-trust (analysis) checker veriñes the validity of the infor-
mation on the mobile code. It is indeed a specialized abstract interpreter 
whose key characteristic is that it does not need to itérate in order to reach 
a ñxpoint (in contrast to standard analyzers). 
While ACC is a general approach, for concreteness we develop herein an incarna-
tion of it in the context of (Constraint) Logic Programming, (C)LP, because this 
paradigm offers a good number of advantages, an important one being the matu-
rity and sophistication of the analysis tools available for it. Also for concreteness, 
we build on the algorithms of (and report on an implementation on) CiaoPP [8], 
the abstract interpretation-based preprocessor of the Ciao multi-paradigm (Con-
straint) Logic Programming system. CiaoPP uses modular, incremental abstract 
interpretation as a fundamental tool to obtain information about programs. The 
semantic approximations thus produced have been applied to perform high- and 
low-level optimizations during program compilation, including transformations 
such as múltiple abstract specialization, parallelization, resource usage control, 
and program veriñcation. We report on our extensión of the framework to in-
corpórate ACC and on how this instantiation of ACC already shows promising 
results. 
2 An Assertion Language to Specify the Safety Policy 
The purpose of a safety policy is to specify precisely the conditions under which 
the execution of a program is considered safe. We propose the use of (a subset of) 
the high-level assertion language [18] available in CiaoPP to deñne an expressive 
class of safety policies in the context of constraint logic programs. 
2.1 Preliminaries and Notation 
We assume familiarity with constraint logic programming [10] (CLP) and the 
concepts of abstract interpretation [5] which underlie most analyses in CLP. 
The remaining of this section introduces some notation and recalls preliminary 
concepts on these topics. 
Terms are constructed from variables (e.g., X), functors (e.g., / ) and pred-
icates (e.g., p). We denote by {Xi i—> í i , . . . ,Xn i—> tn} the substitution a with 
cr(Xj) = ti for alH = 1 , . . . , n (with X¡ ^ Xj if i ^ j) and a(X) = X for any 
other variable X, where í¿ are terms. A renaming is a substitution p for which 
there exists the inverse p^1 such that pp^1 = p^1 p = id. We say that a renaming 
p is a renaming substitution of term íi w.r.t. term ¿2 if Í2 = p{t\). 
A constraint is essentially a conjunction of expressions built from predeñned 
predicates. An atora has the form p{t\, ...,tn) where p is a predicate symbol and 
the U are terms. A literal is either an atom or a constraint. A goal is a ñnite 
sequence of literals. A rule is of the form H:-B where H, the head, is an atom 
and B, the body, is a possibly empty ñnite sequence of literals. A CLP program, 
or program, is a ñnite set of rules. 
Example 1. The main predícate, c r e a t e _ s t r e a m s / 2 , of the following CLP pro-
gram receives a list of numbers which correspond to certain ñle ñames, and 
returns in the second argument the list of ñle handlers (streams) associated to 
the (opened) ñles: 
c r e a t e _ s t r e a m s ( [ ] , [ ] ) . 
c r e a t e _ s t r e a m s ( [ N | N L ] , [ F | F L ] ) : -
number_codes(N,ChInN), app ( " / tmp / " ,ChInN,Fname) , 
s a f e _ o p e n ( F n a m e , w r i t e , F ) , c r e a t e _ s t r e a m s ( N L , F L ) . 
sa fe_open(Fname ,Mode ,S t ream) : -
a tom_cod .es (F i le ,Fname) , o p e n ( F i l e , M o d e , S t r e a m ) . 
The cali number_codes(N,Ch.InN) receives the number N and returns in ChlnN 
the list of the ASCII codes of the characters comprising a representation of 
N. Then, it uses the well-known list concatenation predicate a p p / 3 . The cali 
atom_codes(File,Fn.ame) receives in Fname a list of ASCII codes and returns 
the atom F i l e made up of the corresponding characters. Also, a cali such as 
open (F i l e ,Mode ,S t r eam) opens the ñle named F i l e and returns in Stream the 
stream associated with the ñle. The argument Mode can have any of the valúes: 
r ead , w r i t e , or append.4 
A distinguishing feature of our approach is tha t a class of safety policies can be 
deñned for the different abstract domains available in the system. In particular, 
safety properties are expressed as substitutions in the context of an abstract 
domain (Da) which is simpler than the selected concrete domain (D). An ab-
stract valué is a ñnite representation of a, possibly infinite, set of actual valúes 
in the concrete domain. Our approach relies on the abstract interpretation the-
ory [5], where the set of all possible abstract semantic valúes which represents 
Da is usually a complete lattice or cpo which is ascending chain finite. How-
ever, for this study, abstract interpretation is restricted to complete lattices over 
sets, both for the concrete (2D, C) and abstract (Da, C) domains. Abstract val-
úes and sets of concrete valúes are related via a pair of monotonic mappings 
(a, 7) : abstraction a : 2D —> Da, and concretization 7 : Da —> 2D, such tha t 
Va; _ 2D : j(a(x)) D x and \/y _ Da : a(j(y)) = y. In general IZ is induced 
by C and a. Similarly, the operations of least upper bound (U) and greatest lower 
bound (n) mimic those of 2D in a precise sense. In this framework an abstract 
property is defined as an abstract substi tution which allows us to express prop-
erties, in terms of an abstract domain, tha t the execution of a program must 
satisfy. The description domain we use in our examples is the following regular 
type domain [6]. 
Example 2 ^regular type domain,). We refer t o the regular type domain as eterms, 
since it is the ñame it has in CiaoPP. Abstract substitutions in eterms [21], 
over a set of variables V, assign a regular type to each variable in V. We use 
in our examples t e rm as the most general type (i.e., t e rm = T corresponds 
4
 Predicates number_codes/2, atom_codes/2, and open/3 are ISO-standard Prolog 
predicates, and thus they are available in CiaoPP. 
to all possible terms). We also allow parametric types such as l i s t ( T ) which 
denotes lists whose elements are all of type T. Type l i s t is clearly equivalent 
to l i s t ( t e r m ) . Also, l i s t ( T ) IZ l i s t IZ term for any type T. The least general 
substitution ± assigns the empty set of valúes to each variable.5 
Apart from predeñned types, in the eterms domain, one can have user-deñned 
regular types declared by means of Regular Unary Logic programs [7]. For in-
stance, in the context of mobile code, it is a safety issue whether the code tries 
to access ñles which are not related to the application in the machine consuming 
the code. A very simple safety policy can be to enforce tha t the mobile code 
only accesses temporary ñles. In a UNIX system this can be controlled (under 
some assumptions) by ensuring tha t the ñle resides in the directory / t m p / . The 
following regular type safejname defines this notion of safety:6 
: - regtype safe_name/ l . 
saf e_name("/tmp/" | I L) : - l i s t (L, alph.an.um_ code) . 
: - regtype alph.anum_code/l. 
alph.anum_code(X) : - member(X, "abcdefgh.ijklmnopqrstuvwzyz") . 
alphanum_code(X):- member(X,"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"). 
alphanum_code(X):- member(X,"0123456789"). 
The abstract property made up of substi tution {Xi-^safejiame} expresses tha t 
X is bound to a string which starts by the prefix " / tmp / " followed by a list of 
alpha-numerical characters. In the following, we write simply safe j iame(X) to 
represent it. 
2.2 T h e Safety P o l i c y 
Assertions are syntactic objects which allow expressing a wide variety of high-
level properties of (in our case CLP-) programs. Examples are assertions which 
state information on entry points to a program module, assertions which de-
scribe properties of built-ins, assertions which provide some type declarations, 
cost bounds, etc. The original assertion language [18] available in CiaoPP is com-
posed of several assertion schemes. Among them, we simply consider the two 
following schemes for the purpose of this paper, which intuitively correspond to 
the traditional pre- and postcondition on procedures. 
calis(B, { A p r e ; . . . ; A P r e } ) : They express properties which should hold in any 
cali to a given predicate similarly to the traditional precondition. B is a 
predícate descriptor, Le., it has a predicate symbol as main functor and all 
arguments are distinct free variables, and A P r e , i = l,...,n, are abstract 
properties about execution states. The resulting assertion should be inter-
preted as "in all activations of B at least one property Ap r e should hold in 
the calling state." 
6
 Let us note that certain abstract domains assign a different meaning to _L. In these 
cases, a distinguished symbol (Le., an extra _L) can always be added to represent 
unreachable points. 
6
 The regtype declarations are used to define new regular types in CiaoPP. 
success(B,[\pre,]Xpost): This assertion schema is used to describe a postcon-
dition which must hold on all success states for a given predicate. B is a 
predicate descriptor, and Xpre and Apost are abstract properties about ex-
ecution states. Xpre is optional and must be evaluated w.r.t. the store at 
the calling state to the predicate while condition Apost is evaluated at the 
success state. If the optional Xpre is present, then Apost is only required to 
hold in those success states which correspond to cali states satisfying Ap re. 
Note that several success assertions with different Ap re may be given. 
Therefore, abstract properties Apre and Apost in assertions allow us to express 
conditions, in terms of an abstract domain, that the execution of a program must 
satisfy. Each condition is an abstract substitution corresponding to the variables 
in some atom. In existing approaches, safety policies usually correspond to some 
variants of type safety (which may also control the correct access of memory 
or array bounds [16]). In our system, the (co-)existence of several domains al-
lows expressing a wider range of properties using the assertion language. They 
include a wide class of safety policies based on modes, types, non-failure, ter-
mination, determinacy, non-suspension, non-floundering, cost bounds, and their 
combinations. 
In the CiaoPP preprocessor, the assertion language allows us to deñne the 
safety policy for the run-time system in the presence of foreign functions, built-
ins, etc. In general, it is the task of the compiler designer to deñne the safety 
policies associated to the predeñned system predicates. In addition to these 
assertions, the user can optionally provide further assertions manually for user-
deñned predicates. 
Example 3. The following assertion for predicate saf e_open: 
calis(safe_open(Fname , _ , _ ) , {safejiame(Fname)}) 
provides a simple way to guarantee that all calis to open are safe. It can be read as 
"the calling conventions for predicate saf e_open require that the ñrst argument 
be a safe_name". Meanwhile the following assertion for open is predeñned in our 
system: 
success(open(X,Y,Z), T , {constant(X),io_mode(Y),stream(Z)}) 
It requires, upon success, the ñrst variable to be of type constant, the second 
a proper io_mode and the last one of type stream. 
In contrast to traditional approaches, assertions are not compulsory for every 
predicate. Thus, the user can decide how much effort to put into writing as-
sertions: the more of them there are, the more complete the partial correctness 
of the program is described and more possibilities to detect problems. Indeed, 
pre- and post-conditions are frequently provided by programmers since they are 
often easy to write and very useful for generating program documentation. Nev-
ertheless, the analysis algorithm is able to obtain safe approximations of the 
program behavior even if no assertions are given. This is not always the case in 
other approaches such as classical program veriñcation, in which loop invariants 
are actually required. Such invariants are hard to ñnd and existing automated 
techniques are generally not sufficient to infer them, so that often they have to 
be provided by hand. 
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3 Certifying Programs by Static Analysis 
Fig. 1 presents an overview of ACC as performed in the CiaoPP system. This 
section introduces the certification process (sketched to the left of the ñgure) 
carried out by the producer, i.e., the generation of a certiñcate to at test the 
adherence of the program to the safety policy. The whole certification method is 
based on the foUowing idea: an abstraction of the program computed, by abstract 
interpretation-based analyzers can play the role of certifícate for attesting pro-
gram safety. Our certification process is carried out in the foUowing phases. We 
start from an initial program P. Firstly, the Safety Policy is defined by means of 
a set of assertions AS in the context of an abstract domain Da, as introduced in 
Sect. 2, among a repertoire of Domains available in the system. Secondly, a stan-
dard Analyzer is run, which returns an abstraction of P ' s execution in terms of 
the abstract domain Da. Let us note tha t the analyzer is domain-independent. 
This allows plugging in different abstract Domains provided suitable interfacing 
functions are defined. From the user point of view, it is sufficient to specify the 
particular abstract domain desired during the generation of the safety assertions. 
Then, a verification condition generator, VCGen extracts, from the initial asser-
tions and the abstraction, a Verification Condition (VC) which can be proved 
only if the execution of the code does not viólate the safety policy. If VC can 
be proved (marked as OK in Fig. 1), then the certifícate (i.e., the abstraction) 
is sent together with the program P to the code consumer. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 
give further details on the Abstraction and the VCGen process, respectively. 
3.1 U s i n g A n a l y s i s R e s u l t s as Cert i f icates 
A key idea in our certification process is tha t the certifícate is automatically 
generated by an abstract interpretation-based analyzer (or simply static ana-
lyzer). In particular, the goal dependent (a.k.a. goal oriented) analyzer of [9], 
which is the one implemented in the CiaoPP system, plays the role of Analyzer. 
This analysis algorithm (we simply write Analysis for short in the foUowing) 
receives as input, in addition to the program P and the abstract domain Da, a 
set of calling patterns CP. A calling pa t tern is a description of the calling modes 
(or entries) into the program. For simplicity, we assume tha t P comes enhanced 
with its entries CP. In particular, a set of calling pat terns Q consists of a set 
of pairs of the form (A : CP) where A is a predicate descriptor and CP is an 
abstract substi tution (i.e., a condition of the run-time bindings) of A expressed 
as CP <G Da. In principie, calling pat terns are only required for exported pred-
icates. The analysis algorithm is able to genérate them automatically for the 
remaining internal predicates. Nevertheless, they can still be automatically gen-
erated by assuming T (i.e., no initial data) for all exported predicates (although 
the idea is to improve this information in the initial calling pat terns) . 
In order to compute Analysis(P,Q,Da), traditional (goal dependent) ab-
stract interpreters for (C)LP programs construct an and-or graph (or analysis 
graph) which corresponds to (or approximates) the abstract semantics of the 
program [2]. The graph has two sorts of nodes: or-nodes and and-nodes. O r -
nodes correspond to literals whilst and-nodes to rules. Both kinds of nodes are 
interleaved in the graph and connected as follows. An or-node has ares to those 
and-nodes which correspond to the rules whose head uniñes with the literal 
it represents. An and-node for a rule H :- B\,..., Bn has n ares to the o r -
nodes which corresponds to the literals _B¿ in the body of the rule. Due to space 
limitations, and given tha t it is now well understood, we do not describe here 
algorithm Analysis(P,Q,Da) (details can be found in, e.g., [9]). Nevertheless, 
the checking algorithm of Sect. 4 illustrates how an and-or graph is traversed. 
The analysis graph computed by CiaoPP's analyzer represents an abstract 
model (or abstraction) of the program. It is represented by means of two data 
structures in the output: the answer table and the are dependeney table. The 
following deñnition introduces the notion of analysis table (similar deñnitions 
can be found, e.g., in [2,9]). Informally, it says tha t its entries are of the form 
(A : CP i—> AP) which should be interpreted as "the answer pa t tern for calis to 
A satisfying precondition (or cali substi tution), CP, accomplishes posteondition 
(or success substi tution), AP." 
D e f i n i t i o n 1 ( A T — a n a l y s i s a n s w e r t a b l e ) . Let P be a program. Let Q 
be a set of calling patterns expressed, in the abstract domain Da. We define an 
analysis answer table, AT, as the set of entries (Aj : CPj i—> APj), V? = l..n 
computed, by Analysis(P, Q, Da)[9] where, in each entry, Aj is an atom and, CPj 
and, APj are, respectively, the abstract cali and, success substitutions. 
Intuitively, the answer table contains the answer pat terns for all literals in the 
or-nodes of the graph while the are dependeney table keeps detailed information 
about dependencies among or-nodes in the graph. A central idea in this work 
is tha t , for certifying program safety, it suffices to send the information stored 
in the analysis answer table. In contrast to the original generic algorithm [9], a 
simple analysis checker can be designed for validating the answer table without 
requiring the use of the are dependeney table at all (as we show in Sect. 4). 
The theory of abstract interpretation guarantees tha t the answer table is a safe 
approximation of the runtime behavior (see [2,9] for details). 
Example 4- Take the calling pat tern (c rea te_s t reams(X, Y), { l i s t (X,num)}) , 
which indicates tha t calis to c r e a t e _ s t r e a m s are performed with a list of num-
bers in the ñrst argument. The answer table computed by CiaoPP contains 
(among others) these entries: 
(create_st reams(A,B) : { l i s t (A,num)} i—> { l i s t (A,num) , l i s t ( B , s t ream)}) 
(safe_open(A,B,C) : {sf(A),B = w r i t e } i-> {sf (A),B = w r i t e , stream(B)}) 
The ñrst entry should be interpreted as: all calis to predícate c r e a t e _ s t r e a m s 
provide as input a list of numbers in the ñrst argument and, upon success, they 
yield lists of numbers and streams, respectively, in each of its two arguments. In 
the second entry, it is interesting to note tha t CiaoPP creates the auxiliary type: 
s f ( " / t m p / " | | A ) : - l i s t ( A , n u m c o d e s ) . 
to represent lists of numbers start ing by the preñx " / t m p / " . We use the notation 
B = w r i t e to denote tha t the system generates a new type for B whose only 
element is constant w r i t e . 
In order to increase accuracy, analyzers are usually multivariant on calis (see, e.g., 
[9]). Indeed, though not visible in this example, CiaoPP incorporates a multivari-
ant analysis, i.e., more than one triple (A : CP\ i—> AP\),..., (A: CPn i—> APn) 
n > 1 with CPi 7^  APi for some i,j may be computed for the same predícate 
descriptor A. 
It is important to note tha t our approach would work directly in other pro-
gramming paradigms, such as imperative or functional programming (the latter 
already covered in our current system), as long as a static analyzer/checker is 
available. Note tha t the fundamental components of the approach (ñxpoint se-
mantics and abstract interpretation) have both been widely applied also in these 
paradigms. 
3.2 T h e Ver i f i ca t ion C o n d i t i o n 
In the next step, the verification condition generator (VCGen in Fig. 1) extracts, 
from the initial assertions and answer table, a Verification Condition (VC) which 
can be proved only if the execution of the code does not viólate the safety policy. 
D e f i n i t i o n 2 ( V C — ve r i f i ca t ion c o n d i t i o n ) . Let AT be an analysis answer 
table computed for a program P and a set of calling patterns Q in the abstract 
domain Da. Let S be an assertion. Then, the verification condition, VC(S,AT), 
for S w.r.t. AT is defined as follows: 
A (p(CP)nxPrecv...vp(CP)nxPrec) 
(A:CP^AP)eAT 
if S = calis(B, {Xprec]...; XPrec}) 
VC(S,AT) ::= < 
A p(CP) n Xprec = -L V p(AP) C A P o s t 
(A:CP^AP)eAT 
if S = success(B, Xprec, XPost) 
where p is a variable renaming substitution of A w.r.t. B. 
If AS is a finite set of assertions, then its verification condition, V(AS, AT), 
is the conjunction of the verification conditions of the elements of AS. 
Roughly speaking, the VC generated according to Def. 2 is a conjunction of 
boolean expressions (possibly containing disjunctions) whose validity ensures the 
consistency of a set of assertions w.r.t. the answer table computed by Analysis. 
It distinguishes two different cases depending on the kind of assertion. For calis 
assertions, the VC requires tha t at least one precondition Ap r e c be a safe ap-
proximation of all existing abstract calling pat terns for the atom B. In the case 
of success assertions, there are two cases for them to hold. The ñrst one indi-
cates tha t the precondition is never satisñed and, thus, the assertion trivially 
holds (and the postcondition does not need to be tested). The second corre-
sponds to the case in which the success substitutions computed by analysis for 
the predicate are more particular than the one required by the assertion. 
Example 5. Consider the entry for predicate saf e_open in the answer table of 
Ex. 4 and the calis assertion of Ex. 3 for the same predicate. According to 
Def. 2, the VC is: B = wr i te , sf (X) IZ safejiame(X) whose validity can be easily 
proved in our system since sf IZ safe j iame. This allows CiaoPP to infer tha t 
calis to open performed within this program satisfy the simple safety policy 
discussed in Ex. 1. The complete example includes further assertions for the 
different predicates and its corresponding VCs. We do not include them here 
due to space limitations. 
Therefore, upon creating the answer table and generating the VC, the validity 
of the whole boolean condition is checked by resolving each conjunct separately. 
Note tha t each conjunct consists of comparisons of pairs of abstract substitu-
tions, which simply return either t rue or false but do not compute any substi-
tution. This validation may yield three different possible s tatus: i) the VC is 
indeed checked and the AT is considered a valid abstraction (marked as OK), 
ii) it is disproved, and thus the certiñcate is not valid and the code is deñnitely 
not safe to run (we should obviously correct the program before continuing the 
process); iii) it cannot be proved ñor disproved. The latter case happens because 
some properties are undecidable and the analyzer performs approximations in 
order to always terminate . Therefore, it may not be able t o infer precise enough 
information to verify the conditions. The user can then provide a more reñned 
description of initial calling pat terns or choose a different, ñner-grained, domain. 
Although, it is not shown in the picture, in both the ii) and iii) cases, the certi-
ñcation process needs to be restarted until achieving a VC which meets i). 
The following theorem states the soundness of the VC. Intuitively, it amounts 
to saying tha t if the VC holds, then the execution of the program will preserve 
all safety assertions. Following the notation of [15], we write \>VC when VC is 
valid. 
T h e o r e m 1 ( S o u n d n e s s of t h e Verif icat ion C o n d i t i o n ) . Let AT be an 
analysis answer table for a program P and a set of calling patterns Q in an 
abstract domain Da (as defined in Def. 1). Let AS be a set of assertions. Let 
VC(AS, AT) be the verification condition for AS w.r.t. AT (generated as stated 
in Def. 2). If t>VC(AS,AT), then P satisfies all assertions in AS for all com-
putations described by Q. 
This result derives from the fact tha t the static analysis algorithm of [9] computes 
a safe approximation of the stores reached during computation. 
4 Checking Safety in the Consumer 
The checking process performed by the consumer is illustrated in the right hand 
side of Fig. 1. Initially, the supplier sends the program P together with the 
certifícate to the consumer. To retain the safety guarantees, the consumer can 
provide a new set of assertions which specify the Safety Policy required by this 
particular consumer. It should be noted that ACC is very flexible in that it allows 
different implementations on the way the safety policy is provided. Clearly, the 
same assertions AS used by the producer can be sent to the consumer. But, 
more interestingly, the consumer can decide to impose a weaker safety condition 
which can still be proved with the submitted abstraction. Also, the imposed 
safety condition can be stronger and it may not be proved if it is not implied by 
the current abstraction (which means that the code would be rejected). From the 
provided assertions, the consumer must genérate again a trustworthy VC and 
use the incoming certifícate to efñciently check that the VC holds. Thus, in the 
validation process, a code consumer not only checks the validity of the answer 
table but it also (re-)generates a trustworthy VC. The re-generation of VC (and 
its corresponding validation) is identical to the process already discussed in the 
previous section. Therefore, this section describes only the former part of the 
validation process, Le., algorithm check. 
Although global analysis is now routinely used as a practical tool, it is still un-
acceptable to run the whole Analysis to validate the certifícate since it involves 
considerable cost. One of the main reasons is that the analysis algorithm is an it-
erative process which often computes answers (repeatedly) for the same cali due 
to possible updates introduced by further computations. At each iteration, the 
algorithm has to manipúlate rather complex data structures—which involve per-
forming updates, lookups, etc.—until the ñxpoint is reached. The whole valida-
tion process is centered around the following observation: the checking algorithm 
can be defined as a very simplified "one-pass" analyzer. The computation of the 
Analysis algorithm can be understood as: Analysis = fixpoint(analy sis step). 
Le., a process which repeatedly performs a traversal of the analysis graph (de-
noted by analysisstep) until the computed information does not change. The 
idea is that the simple, non-iterative, analysisstep process can play the role 
of abstract interpretation-based checker (or simply analysis checker). In other 
words, check = analysisstep. Intuitively, since the certiñcation process already 
provides the ñxpoint result as certifícate, an additional analysis pass over it can-
not change the result. Thus, as long as the answer table is valid, one single 
execution of analysisstep validates the certifícate. 
The next deñnition presents our abstract interpretation-based, checking al-
gorithm. It receives as an additional input a Certificate (which is the analysis 
ñxpoint). In a single traversal, it constructs a program analysis graph by using 
the information in Certificate. The algorithm is devised as a graph traversal pro-
cedure which places entries in a local answer table, AT, as new nodes in the 
program analysis graph are encountered. Thus, it handles two distinct answer 
tables: the local AT + the incoming Certificate. The ñnal goal of the checking is 
to reconstruct the analysis graph and compare the results with the information 
stored in Certifícate. As long as Certifícate is valid, both results coincide and, 
thus, the certifícate is guaranteed to be valid w.r.t. the program. 
D e f i n i t i o n 3 ( A n a l y s i s C h e c k e r ) . Let P be a normalized7 program and Q be 
a set of calling patterns in the abstract domain Da. Let Certifícate be a safety 
certifícate as defined in Def. 1. The validation of Certifícate is performed by the 
procedure check depicted in Figure 2. The algorithm uses a local answer table, 
AT, to compute the results (initially it does not contain any entry). Procedure 
check is defined in terms offive abstract operations [9] on the description domain 
Da of interest: 
— Arestrict( CP,V) performs the abstract restriction of a description CP to the 
set of variables in the set V, denoted vars(V); 
— Aextend (CP, V) extends the description CP to the variables in the set V; 
— Aadd(C, CP) performs the abstract operation of conjoining the actual con-
straint C with the description CP; 
— Aconj(CPi, CP2) performs the abstract conjunction of two descriptions; 
— Alub(CPi, CP2) performs the abstract disjunction of two descriptions. 
Following the presentation of Analysis [9], we assume tha t the program 
P and the answer table are global parameters throughout the algorithm. The 
checking algorithm proceeds as follows. For each calling pa t tern in the set Q, 
the procedure process_node inspects all rules deñning the considered atom. For 
each rule, it performs a left-to-right traversal of the atoms in the rule body. 
The processing of each atom B¡~,i in the rule body is handled by process_arc. 
We refer by CPf, to the description of the program point immediately before the 
atom Bk,i and by CPa t o the description after processing the atom. Initially, 
the description CP\, takes the valué of the initial description CP for the calling 
pat tern A : CP (extended to all the variables in the rule).8 We use variables 
CPRX to denote tha t description CPX has been restricted, with x <G {a, b}. The 
procedure process_arc is aimed at computing the resulting description CPa after 
processing a given atom Bk,i- It distinguishes two different cases: 
— Constraints are simply abstractly added to the current description. 
— If Bk,i is an atom, then it inspects whether it has been processed before: 
• If the atom already has an entry in the answer table, we do not need to 
recompute it. Indeed, this could risk the termination of the algorithm. 
• Otherwise, we process it by executing procedure process_node. On return, 
and in the absence of errors, this processing will have placed an answer 
for Bk i in the answer table (and possibly for other related atoms as 
well). ' 
Either way, there will be an answer for the atom at this point. This answer 
is conjoined8 with the description CP\, from the program point immediately 
before Bk¿ in order to obtain the description for the program point after it. 
7
 For clarity of presentation, in the algorithm we assume that all rule heads are normal-
ized, Le., H is of the form p(Xi,..., Xn) where X\,..., Xn are distinct free variables. 
8
 Further insights on the operations on abstract substitutions (like extensions, restric-
tions, disjunctions etc.) can be found in [2]. 
check(Q, Certifícate) 
foreach A : CP € Q 
process_node(A : CP, Certifícate) 
r e t u r n Valid 
process_node(A : CP, Certifícate) 
if (3 a renaming a s.t. a(A : CP i—• AP) in Certifícate) 
then add (A : CP ^ AP) to AT 
else return Error 
foreach rule Ak <— Bk,i, • • •, Bk,nk in P 
W := vars(Ak,Bk,i, • • • ,Bk,nk) 
CPb :=Aextend(CP,vars(Bk,i,... , Bk,„k)) 
CPRb := Arestrict(CP6, Bk,i) 
foreach Bk,i in the rule body i = 1,..., rik 
CPa := process_arc(Bfc,¿ : CPRb, CPb, W, Certifícate) 
if (i O nk) then CPRa := Arestrict(CP0, var(Bk,i+i)) 
CPb :=CPa 
CPRb := CPRa 
AP! := Arestñct(CPa,vars(Ak)) 
AP2 :=A\ub(AP1,a-1(AP)) 
if A P < > AP2 then return Error 
process_arc(_Bfci¿ : CPRb, CPb, W, Certifícate) 
if Bk,i is a constraint then CPa := Aadd (Bk,í, CPb) 
elseif (¡B a renaming a s.t. a(Bk,i : CPRb ^ AP') in AT) 
then process.node (Bk,i '• CPRb, Certifícate) 
AP1 := Aextend (p _ 1 (AP), W) where p i s a renaming s.t. 
p(Bk,i : CPRb ^ AP) in AT 
CPa := Aconj (CP6 ,APi) 
return CPa 
Fig. 2. Abstract Interpretation-based Checking in CiaoPP 
The computed result is used to process the next literal in the rule when B¡~,i 
is not the last literal. Otherwise, the computed result constitutes indeed the 
computed answer for the rule. The answer is combined8 with the corresponding 
answer supplied by the certiñcation process in Certifícate. If Certifícate is valid, 
the comparison should hold; otherwise the process prompts an error and the 
program is not safe to run. 
The following theorem ensures tha t algorithm check is able to validate safety 
certiñcates which are stored in a valid analysis answer table. 
T h e o r e m 2 (part ia l correc tness ) . Let P be a program, let Q be a set of 
calling patterns in an abstract domain Da. Let Certifícate be a safety certifícate 
for P and Q as stated, in Def. 1. Then, ch.eck(Q, Certifícate) terminates and 
validates Certifícate in P. 
The theorem can be demonstrated by showing tha t check is a simpliñed versión of 
Analysis [9] in two main aspects. Regarding the efficiency, our point to justify 
an efficient behavior of check for validating an answer table is tha t it performs a 
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Table 1. Checking Time and Certifícate Size 
single graph traversal. Indeed, for a regular type domain, [4] demonstrates that 
directional type-checking for logic programs is ñxed-parameter linear. The next 
section reports experimental evidence of efficieney issues. 
5 Experimental Results 
In this section we show some experimental results aimed at studying two crucial 
points for the practicality of our proposal: the checking time as compared to 
the analysis time, and the size of certiñcates. We have implemented the checker 
as a simpliñeation of the generic abstract interpretation system of CiaoPP. It 
should be noted that this is an efficient, highly optimized, state-of-the-art anal-
ysis system and which is part of a working compiler. Both the analysis and 
checker are parametric w.r.t. the abstract domain. In these experiments they 
both use the same implementation of the domain-dependent functions of the 
sharing+freeness domain [14]. We have selected this domain because the infor-
mation it infers is very useful for reasoning about instantiation errors, which is a 
crucial aspect for the safety of logic programs. The whole system is implemented 
in Ciao 1.11^200 [3] with compilation to bytecode. AU of our experiments have 
been performed on a Pentium 4 at 2.4GHz and 512MB RAM running GNU 
Linux RH9.0. The Linux kernel used is 2.4.25, customized with the hrtime patch 
to provide improved precisión and resolution in time measurements. 
Execution times are given in milliseconds and measure runtime. They are 
computed as the arithmetic mean of ñve runs. A relatively wide range of pro-
grams has been used as benchmarks. They are the same ones used in [9], where 
they are described in some detail. For each benchmark, the columns for Analysis 
are the following: P^ is the time required by the preprocessing phase, in which 
program clauses are processed and stored in the format required by the ana-
lyzer. The analysis time proper is shown in column An. The actual time needed 
for analysis -the sum of these two times- is shown in column T^. Similarly, in 
the case of checking, three columns are shown. The preprocessing phase, Pe, 
includes asserting the certifícate in addition to asserting the program to be ana-
lyzed. As the figures show, the overhead required for asserting the certifícate is 
negligible. Column Ch is the time for executing the checking algorithm. Finally, 
Te is the total time for checking. The columns under Speedup compare analysis 
and checking times. As can be seen in columns A/C and T^/Tc, the checking 
algorithm is faster than the analysis algorithm in all cases. The actual speedup 
ranges from almost none, as in the case of zebra, to over four times faster in the 
case of deriv. The last row summarizes the results for the different benchmarks 
using a weighted mean, which places more importance on those benchmarks 
with relatively larger analysis times. We use as weight for each program its ac-
tual analysis time. We believe that this weighted mean is more informative than 
the arithmetic mean, as, for example, doubling the speed in which a large and 
complex program is analyzed (checked) is more relevant than achieving this for 
small, simple programs. Overall, the speedup is 1.63 in just analysis time, or 
1.61 if we also take into account the preprocessing time. We believe that the 
achieved speedup is signiñeant taking into account that CiaoPP's analyzer for 
this domain is highly optimized and converges very efficiently. However, it is to 
be expected that, for other domains and implementations, the relative gains will 
be higher. 
The second part of the table studies the size of the certiñeates, coded in 
compact (fastread) format, for the different benchmarks and compares it to the 
size of the source code for the same program and to the size of the corresponding 
bytecode. To make this comparison fair, we subtract 4180 bytes from the size of 
the bytecode for each program: the size of the bytecode for an empty program 
in this versión of Ciao (minimal top-level drivers and exception handlers for any 
executable). The results show the size of the certifícate to be quite reasonable. It 
ranges from 0.3 times the size of the source code (for deriv) to 3.5 (in the case of 
qsortapp). Overall, it is 1.44 times the size of the source code. We consider this 
acceptable since in general Prolog programs are quite compact (up to 10 times 
more compact than equivalent imperative programs). In fact, the size of source 
plus certifícate is smaller (1+1.44) than that of the bytecode (2.66). 
6 Discussion and Related Work 
The main contribution of this work is to introduce, implement, and (preliminar-
ily) benchmark abstraction-carrying code (ACC) as a novel enabling technology 
for PCC, which is based throughout on the use of abstract interpretation tech-
niques. We argüe that ACC is highly flexible due to the parametricity on the 
abstract domain inherited from the analysis engines used in (C)LP. Our ap-
proach differs from existing approaches to PCC in several aspeets. In our case, 
the certiñcate is computed automatically on the producer side by an abstract 
interpretation-based analyzer and the certiñcate takes the form of a particu-
lar subset of the analysis results. The burden on the consumer side is reduced 
by using a simple one-traversal checker, which is a very simpliñed and efficient 
abstract interpreter which does not need to compute a ñxpoint. 
A type-level dataflow analysis of Java virtual machine bytecode is also the 
basis of most existing veriñers [12,11], and some are loosely based on abstract 
interpretation. These analyses allow proving that the program is correct w.r.t. 
type-related correctness conditions. In [19] a proposal is presented to split the 
type-based bytecode veriñcation of the KVM (an embedded variant of the JVM) 
in two phases, where the producer ñrst computes the certiñcate by means of a 
type-based dataflow analyzer and then the consumer simply checks that the 
types provided in the code certiñcate are valid. As in our case, the second phase 
can be done in a single, linear pass over the bytecode. However, these approaches 
are designed limited to types, whereas our approach is inherently parametric and 
thus supports a very rich set of domains, and combinations of several of them. 
Let us note that the checker is part of the trusted computing base and, henee, 
the code consumer has to trust also the domain operations. Other approaches 
to PCC use logic-based veriñcation methods as enabling technology, an example 
is [22] which formalises a simple assembly language with procedures and presents 
a safety policy for arithmetic overflow in Isabelle/HOL. The coexistence of 
several abstract domains in our framework is somewhat related to the notion of 
models to capture the security-relevant properties of code, as addressed in the 
work on Model-Carrying Code (MCC) [20]. 
Another difference between our work and other related work is that the 
instance that we have described is actually deñned at the source-level, whereas 
in existing PCC frameworks the code supplier typically packages the certiñcate 
with the object code rather than with the source code (both are untrusted). 
Actually, both approaches are of interest from our point of view (and, in fact, our 
approach can also be applied to bytecode). Open-source code is becoming much 
more relevant these days (in fact, Ciao and CiaoPP are themselves GNU-licensed 
and available in source code). As a result, it is now realistic to expect that a 
relatively large amount of untrusted source code is available to the consumer. The 
advantages of open-source with respect to safety are important since it allows 
inspecting the code and applying powerful techniques for program analysis and 
validation which allow inferring information which may be difficult to observe 
in low-level, compiled code. 
References 
1. D. Aspinall, S. Gilmore, M. Hofmann, D. Sannella, and I. Stark. Mobile resource 
guarantees for smart devices. In G. Barthe, L. Burdy, M. Huisman, J.-L. Lanet, 
and T. Muntean, editors, Proceedings of CASSIS'04, LNCS. Springer, 2004. 
2. M. Bruynooghe. A Practical Framework for the Abstract Interpretation of Logic 
Programs. Journal of Logic Programming, 10:91-124, 1991. 
3. F. Bueno, D. Cabeza, M. Carro, M. Hermenegildo, P. López-García, and G. Puebla. 
The Ciao System. Reference Manual (vi.10). May 2004. Technical University of 
Madrid (UPM). Available at h t t p : / / c l i p .d i a . f i . upm.es /Sof tware /C iao . 
4. W. Charatonik. Directional Type Checking for Logic Programs: Beyond Discrim-
inative Types. In Proc. of ESOP 2000, pages 72-87. LNCS 1782, 2000. 
5. P. Cousot and R. Cousot. Abstract Interpretation: a Unified Lattice Model for 
Static Analysis of Programs by Construction or Approximation of Fixpoints. In 
Proc. of POPL'77, pages 238-252, 1977. 
6. P.W. Dart and J. Zobel. A Regular Type Language for Logic Programs. In Types 
in Logic Programming, pages 157-187. MIT Press, 1992. 
7. T. Früwirth, E. Shapiro, M.Y. Vardi, and E. Yardeni. Logic programs as types for 
logic programs. In Proc. LICS'91, pages 300-309, 1991. 
8. M. Hermenegildo, G. Puebla, F. Bueno, and P. López-García. Program Develop-
ment Using Abstract Interpretation (and The Ciao System Preprocessor). In Proc. 
ofSAS'03, pages 127-152. Springer LNCS 2694, 2003. 
9. M. Hermenegildo, G. Puebla, K. Marriott, and P. Stuckey. Incremental Analysis 
of Constraint Logic Programs. ACM TOPLAS, 22(2):187-223, March 2000. 
10. J. Jaffar and M.J. Maher. Constraint Logic Programming: A Survey. Journal of 
Logic Programming, 19/20:503-581, 1994. 
11. Xavier Leroy. Java bytecode verification: algorithms and formalizations. Journal 
of Automated Reasoning, 30(3-4):235-269, 2003. 
12. T. Lindholm and F. Yellin. The Java Virtual Machine Specification. Addison-
Wesley, 1997. 
13. G. Morrisett, D. Walker, K. Crary, and N. Glew. From system F to typed assembly 
language. ACM TOPLAS, 21(3):527-568, 1999. 
14. K. Muthukumar and M. Hermenegildo. Combined Determination of Sharing and 
Freeness of Program Variables Through Abstract Interpretation. In 1991 Interna-
tional Conference on Logic Programming, pages 49-63. MIT Press, June 1991. 
15. G. Necula. Proof-Carrying Code. In Proc. of POPL'97, pages 106-119. ACM 
Press, 1997. 
16. G. Necula and P. Lee. The Design and Implementation of a Certifying Compiler. 
In Proc. of PLDI'98. ACM Press, 1998. 
17. G.C. Necula and S.P. Rahul. Oracle-based checking of untrusted software. In 
Proceedings of POPL'01, pages 142-154. ACM Press, 2001. 
18. G. Puebla, F. Bueno, and M. Hermenegildo. An Assertion Language for Constraint 
Logic Programs. In Analysis and Visualization Tools for Constraint Programming, 
pages 23-61. Springer LNCS 1870, 2000. 
19. K. Rose, E. Rose. Lightweight bytecode verification. In OOPSALA Workshop on 
Formal Underpinnings of Java, 1998. 
20. R. Sekar, V.N. Venkatakrishnan, S. Basu, S. Bhatkar, and D. DuVarney. Model-
carrying code: A practical approach for safe execution of untrusted applications. 
In Proc. ofSOSP'03, pages 15-28. ACM, 2003. 
21. C. Vaucheret and F. Bueno. More precise yet efficient type inference for logic 
programs. In Proc. of SAS'02, pages 102-116. Springer LNCS 2477, 2002. 
22. M. Wildmoser and T. Nipkow. Certifying Machine Code Safety: Shallow Versus 
Deep Embedding. In TPHOLs, number 3223 in LNCS. Springer, 2004. 
